Democrats want a new Joe Rogan — but their dogma won’t allow it

A New York Times report this week revealed how the Democratic Party is mobilizing its donor class in a coordinated effort to reclaim cultural dominance. In the aftermath of the 2024 election, the dominant progressive narrative has avoided serious self-critique. Rather than acknowledge Kamala Harris’ unpopularity or the unappealing nature of her platform, Democrats have instead blamed independent media — most notably Joe Rogan’s podcast — for her defeat.

This obsession with podcasting has driven Democrats to propose 26 separate initiatives aimed at restoring their lost cultural dominance, backed by tens of millions of donor dollars. But no matter how much they spend, they cannot purchase the one thing they now lack: authenticity.

The Democratic Party cannot manufacture its own Joe Rogan, because its ideology forbids the conditions that make someone like Rogan possible.

When politics becomes a surrogate religion, every policy becomes an article of faith. Apostasy, even for strategic reasons, is unthinkable. The 2024 election dealt a decisive blow to the progressive project. In a normal political environment, such a loss would prompt recalibration. But for Democrats, adjustment is impossible. Wokeness is no longer a means to an end — it has become the end itself.

Some within the party briefly suggested a return to the economic populism associated with Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.). Those suggestions were quickly silenced. Party elites rejected substance in favor of narrative, attributing their defeat not to ideology but to communication failure. Their solution is to manufacture a parallel influencer ecosystem — essentially, a Manhattan Project for progressive social media.

Democratic strategists openly discuss their desire to create a “left-wing Joe Rogan.” The irony is glaring: They already had one. His name was Joe Rogan. But they pushed him out of the coalition for refusing to submit to ideological conformity.

Progressives recognize the importance of cultural power. What they fail to grasp is that the culture they hope to reproduce cannot be engineered through funding or message discipline. The problem is not the messenger — it’s the message.

Rogan and other prominent podcasters such as Tim Dillon and Theo Von are not natural conservatives. They are comedians, drawn toward irreverence and instinctively opposed to rigid social norms. Popular culture has long associated moral puritanism with the religious right, but for decades now, it has been the left enforcing an increasingly suffocating moral orthodoxy. That men like Rogan have drifted away from progressivism under pressure from this new puritanism only underscores how deeply censorious the modern left has become.

The New York Times story concedes as much. It quotes Democratic consultants who say the goal is to “avoid the hall monitor mentality” that dominates their political brand. But that mentality is not a rhetorical accident — it is central to their identity.

Progressivism, as practiced today, functions like a disciplinary institution. Its adherents find moral satisfaction in correction and control. This dynamic alienates key demographics, especially young men, who have left the party in large numbers. And yet the behavior continues, because it is integral to the ideological structure. Asking the left to abandon its scolding posture is like asking a devout Christian to deny Christ — it’s not just a tactic; it’s the organizing principle.

Podcasting feels authentic not because conservatives suddenly became more truthful but because the podcast space allowed genuine conversations to emerge. Legacy conservative media was often as sterile and contrived as its progressive counterpart. But podcasting, by its decentralized and long-form nature, made room for the unscripted. And when people are allowed to speak freely, their conclusions tend to drift right — not because of partisanship but because truth tends to align with natural order, and natural order is inherently at odds with progressive orthodoxy.

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The GOP had no role in building the podcast sphere — and to its discredit, it never would have tried. Republican institutions still treat culture as peripheral to politics, investing only in short-term electoral returns. Democrats, by contrast, understand that cultural influence is a long game. That’s why they’re panicking now.

Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter may not have resulted in immediate legislative victories, but it was arguably the most important right-aligned political event of the past decade. It shifted the terrain of public discourse in ways that conventional politics never could.

This is the source of the left’s anxiety. The podcast sphere, despite its independence from traditional conservative infrastructure, now functions as a cultural counterweight. Not because it was funded by think tanks or coordinated by campaigns but because it grew organically out of cultural exhaustion. Its voices include comedians, disillusioned academics, and rogue cartoonists like Scott Adams — people driven not by ideology but by the sense that something fundamental in their world had broken.

The Democratic Party cannot manufacture its own Joe Rogan, because its ideology forbids the conditions that make someone like Rogan possible. It cannot reach the audiences it most desperately needs — especially young white men — because it has built its entire moral framework around blaming them for the ills of society.

Conservatives should take note. The left understands that culture drives politics. The right must learn the same lesson — and fast. While the right didn’t build the podcast sphere, it can nurture and expand it. That requires more than talking points or candidate funding. It requires investment in art, literature, music, and media that affirm reality and speak to a deeper longing for order and meaning.

Cultural power matters. The left knows this. The right must act like it does, too — before the window of opportunity closes.